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ABSTRACT 
 
Learning curves have been studied for a long time. These studies provided strong support to the hypothesis that, 
as organizations produce more of a product, unit costs of production decrease at a decreasing rate (see Argote, 
1999 for a comprehensive review of learning curve studies). But the organizational mechanisms that lead to 
these results are still underexplored. We know some drivers of learning curves (ADLER; CLARK, 1991; 
LAPRE et al., 2000), but we still lack a more detailed view of the organizational processes behind those curves. 
Through an ethnographic study, I bring a comprehensive account of the first year of operations of a new 
automotive plant, describing what was taking place on in the assembly area during the most relevant shifts of the 
learning curve. The emphasis is then on how learning occurs in that setting. My analysis suggests that the overall 
learning curve is in fact the result of an integration process that puts together several individual ongoing learning 
curves in different areas throughout the organization. In the end, I propose a model to understand the evolution 
of these learning processes and their supporting organizational mechanisms.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The first works on organizational learning curves date back to the 1930s, based on a simple yet 
powerful finding: unit costs decline with cumulative output (WRIGHT, 1936). This effect happens 
beyond scale economies or increased inputs of labor and capital, and it reflects learning by doing at the 
organizational level. This finding has fostered research in different industries and, although the effect 
varies in magnitude, results give support to the learning by doing hypothesis. In management, learning 
curves began to be researched more systematically from the late 1980s onwards. Argote et al. (1990) 
showed that, although learning by doing does happen, the knowledge acquired through this process 
depreciates rapidly. They also found out that vicarious learning happens: organizations beginning 
production later are more productive than those with early start dates. This learning, however, happens 
only before production starts – after that, organizations do not benefit from learning in other 
organizations. Epple et al. (1996) analysed the introduction of a second shift in an automotive plant 
and discovered out that virtually all knowledge acquired during the period on one-shift operation was 
carried forward to the period of two-shift operation in less than two weeks. Argote and Darr (2000) 
found that production knowledge in pizza stores depreciated less rapidly than service knowledge, and 
proposed that the difference was due to the fact that production knowledge was embedded in training 
materials whereas service knowledge was not codified and thus embedded primarily in individuals.  
Most research in learning curves results from regression models where output – either cumulative 
(LIEBERMAN, 1984) or over time (EPPLE et al., 1991) – is correlated with some measure of costs 
(direct labor hours, cost). In the past few years, authors have tried to open the black box of learning 
curves, shifting the focus from outcomes to processes. Adler (1990) suggested that shared learning 
(across the development/manufacturing interface and between plants) is one of the main drivers of 
productivity improvement; Adler and Clark (1991) studied the effects of engineering changes and 
workforce training (which for them represents second-order learning) on learning curves and 
discovered that these effects vary substantially across processes. Lapre et al. (2000) studied the effects 
of conceptual (‘know-why’) and operational (‘know-how’) learning on quality improvement. Pisano et 
al. (2001) compared learning rates in 16 hospitals performing the same surgery and suggested that 
learning by doing may be a firm specific capability: if an organization does not develop mechanisms 
for capturing knowledge and implementing learning, experience may not translate into increased 
performance. Another departure from traditional learning curves has been to adopt quality measures 
instead of cost measures (LAPRE et al., 2000; LEVIN, 2000). Levin (2000) shows that quality 
learning also exhibits a ‘learning curve’ behavior, except that the curve is more of a function of time 
than a function of cumulative experience, and most improvements come when a product is first 
introduced (rather than during subsequent production). 
Although most recent papers stress that understanding the process behind learning curves is crucial, 
they fall short of bringing a detailed model of those processes. The most detailed papers so far brought 
at most two process dimensions in their models (e.g. ADLER; CLARK, 1991; LAPRE et al., 2000). 
Pisano et al. (2001) is a step forward: although their model does not bring process dimensions, they 
bring qualitative evidence from case studies to explain differences in their quantitative findings 
The relationships between different types of learning or knowledge and the learning curve have been 
further explored in the past few years. Lapre and Wassenhove (2003) show that conceptual and 
operational learning (i.e. knowing cause-effect relationships and action-outcome links) are both 
needed to accelerate the learning curve. Edmondson et al. (2003) show that dimensions of 
performance that rely on tacit knowledge result in more heterogeneous learning curves across 
organizations and that late adopters improve more quickly than early adopters in those dimensions that 
rely on codified knowledge. Schilling et al. (2003) suggest that some degree in variation in the 
learning process improves the learning rate. All these studies started to open the black box of learning 
curves, through experiments or comparison across different cases. I add to those studies by bringing a 
more longitudinal, micro view of the learning processes, focusing on actions taken by actors across 
different organizational levels during the first year of a new factory. This focus on the micro processes Learning Curve? Which One? 
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brings to the forefront the social aspects of the learning processes, bridging a gap that is still missing 
between the micro learning processes within groups and the overall learning curve at the 
organizational level. 
 
 
THE SETTING 
 
 
This paper adds the social dimension to the analysis of learning curves. The intention is not to show 
that a learning curve happened, but to show how it happened. In order to be able to see the 
organizational processes supporting the evolution of learning curves, I developed my study in the early 
days of a new setting. The setting chosen was a new automotive plant. This plant was the first one that 
the parent company was building in the country where the plant is located. Most workers, even at the 
managerial level, had no previous experience in automotive companies. Shop floor workers had no 
experience in factory work, since the plant was set in a region with no manufacturing tradition. Given 
that, they had to go through an eight-week training period (organized by the company in association 
with local institutions) before being eligible for a position in the company.  
The plant launched two car models in its first year of operations; both models were already produced 
at other plants of the parent company. They attempted to transfer some of their practices to the new 
setting. But, given the difficulties in transferring practices (e.g. SZULANSKI, 1996), the fact that most 
of the workers had no experience in automotive factories, and the different environmental forces and 
the practices developed were not a simple and immediate replication of those of the parent company 
(FRUIN, 1998). Some practices were transferred directly, some recontextualized and some developed 
from scratch. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
I developed an ethnographic study of the initial period in the life of an automotive plant, with the 
overall aim of observing the evolution of organizational capabilities. I spent an average of 4 days a 
week in the plant for a period of one year. Total time spent in the field was roughly 2000 hours. Before 
the period spent in the specific setting, I carried out 45 interviews in 3 companies. These interviews 
were aimed at 1) building relationships with the companies, 2) gathering information to select the most 
appropriate site and 3) having a view from managers on what would be the capabilities they wanted to 
develop in the new plants would be. I then selected one company, did some further interviews in their 
headquarters and started my ethnography at the new plant. During the first weeks I interviewed fifteen 
managers from different areas. Soon I started to attend some meetings within the organization, 
especially the daily production meetings in two areas: body shop and assembly. I was also making 
observations and informal interviews in productive areas. After two months I started to follow one 
assembly line from the day they produced their very first car. From then on, I spent around 60% of my 
time making observations and the remaining 40% following managerial meetings and doing informal 
and formal interviews. My notes filled 4000 small notepad pages. They comprise facts (e.g. who was 
doing what at what time), interpretations (spontaneous or induced reactions people had at specific 
events), meeting transcriptions, informal and formal interviews, and my own reactions to the events I 
was witnessing. I also collected company documents and performance data (production and quality).  
Data interpretation followed a coding process in many ways similar to the process of grounded 
theory building (GLASER; STRAUSS, 1967), but with some important conceptual differences that are 
specific to ethnography. The two methods do share some similarities in data interpretation, as both use 
comparable processes of generating understanding with iterative comparisons of data and theory. But 
the comparisons made at data analysis in grounded theory are focused on concepts rather than 
particular actors or contexts, resulting in a theory abstracted from the specificities of particular Paulo Prochno 
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situations (STEWART, 1998). For the present paper, my main aim when coding the data was to 
generate categories that would accurately represent the organizational processes happening at specific 
stages during the learning curve evolution. 
 
 
THE LEARNING CURVE 
 
 
Figure one brings the learning curve for the assembly area in terms of cumulative production for the 
first year of operations. For confidentiality reasons, all numbers are omitted. The axis represents direct 
labor costs. To calculate that number, I took into account the added costs of working overtime 
(overtime was used quite extensively in the first months). While this does not represent the true 
evolution of number of hours taken to complete a vehicle (since some hours are calculated at higher 
costs, so the curve underestimates learning in terms of hours per vehicle), I chose to present the data in 
this way because it represents more accurately what was going on in the organization as a whole. The 
extensive use of overtime had its reasons (which I will explain below), and analyzing these reasons is 
important for understanding organizational learning. If my focus were specifically on shop floor 
learning, the number of hours would be a more accurate number. But as I wish to describe what was 
happening in the organization as a whole, especially in the assembly area and the units that had to 
interact with it daily, labor costs are a better measure. 
I divided the learning curve into three periods (see Figure 1) that will be described below. In the first 
one, costs are high and the process is very unstable. In period two, costs go down quite rapidly, but the 
process is still subject to big variations that cause a series of spikes in the learning curve. In the third 
period, the cost decrease rate goes down but the process is more stable. My analysis here will be 
purely qualitative, describing what was going on in the organization during these periods based on my 
observations, informal and formal interviews and participation in production meetings. The aim is to 
identify drivers of the learning curve behavior at each stage, presenting a comprehensive and detailed 
view of the activities in the plant during its first year. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 1: Slack and Ambiguity 
 
The first period in the learning curve evolution (see Figure 1) was characterized by a lot of slack on 
the shop floor. Workers were performing their activities slowly and had a good deal of free time 
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between cars. This was not because they were not skilled enough to do it faster: as one assembler told 
me during that period, “don’t assume it is going to be like that always - in our training we were 
working at a much faster pace. I don’t know why they are going so slow now… I guess it is the 
planning, isn’t it? But why?” In fact, she was right. A lot of what was going during this period was the 
result of what had been planned. The organization, based on an assessment of its own resources and 
suppliers’ capabilities, planned quite a steep ramp-up – after some weeks of production, daily 
production would increase more than tenfold (with only twice the number of workers). Such a 
situation necessarily resulted in slack on the shop floor during the initial weeks. But there were other 
problems in the organization that were disturbing the evolution of production. Even with all the slack 
on the shop floor, objectives were not being met in the initial weeks due to problems at the production 
management level. 
The first weeks of production (after almost three months of tryouts) were quite messy at the 
organizational level. As the daily production meetings started, representatives from different areas had 
a hard time trying to understand what was going on and what role they should play. Up to that 
moment, areas had worked mostly in isolation, developing their own cognitive frameworks. When 
production started, the different knowledge bases spread over different areas had to be integrated, but 
the process was not an easy one. The main initial difficulty was to select which items of information 
were needed to perform activities, solve problems and determine where to find this information. There 
were no set channels of communication between areas, so relevant information usually arrived too 
late. Even when the areas had the information they needed, procedures were still unclear and many 
documents were unknown. 
Areas were still working under their own logic and felt they did not ‘belong’ to the assembly area. 
During one meeting, for example, a process engineer was referring to assembly in the 2
nd person: 
“when you start using the new tool…” The assembly manager corrected him immediately: “when WE 
start using the new tool, not YOU… you’re also one of us!” This behavior was rather common; 
members that would be working on the assembly full time still kept a distance from its activities. Their 
reference point was their own functional area. 
One important issue at this stage was that these different areas were still going through their own 
learning curves. Although they had accumulated a good deal of declarative knowledge, the procedural 
knowledge concerning how to interact with other areas was still at an early stage of development. And, 
as they developed this knowledge linked to action, they discovered they needed more declarative 
knowledge as well. This process was similar to what has been conceptualized by Cook and Brown 
(1999) as “the generative dance between organizational knowledge and organizational knowing”. 
Knowing is “to interact with and honor the world using knowledge as a tool” (COOK; BROWN, 1999, 
p. 389), or the epistemological dimension of action itself. This component was missing at early 
interactions. Areas started with some stock of knowledge; the start of production triggered the 
development of knowing, which called for more knowledge to solve new problems arising with the 
start of interactions. This was happening with all areas in parallel; they were all going through 
something of an ‘organizational learning curve’, expanding the boundaries of their local knowledge to 
meet other bodies of knowledge being developed elsewhere in the organization. 
Since most of workers were new to the organization (and to the auto industry), they did not know 
their exact roles, so there was a lot of confusion over who should do what. There was a tendency to 
generate more and more reports to reduce uncertainty, but this information was still not properly used 
and shared. Under such circumstances, solving problems was a difficult task. But given that the 
planned daily production was still low, many problems were still hard to notice. Daily production 
meetings served the purpose of information sharing, where people tried to learn more about the 
functioning of production and the role of each area. 
These problems at the production management level had an impact on shop floor performance 
evolution. There were many days where production was halted because parts were missing (usually 
due to problems with information sharing between production and parts supply), or cars did not come 
from the paint shop (which was also facing many problems and going through its own learning curve). Paulo Prochno 
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Some tools were still missing, so workers had to use alternative ways to do some of their tasks. That 
way, there were two major reasons behind the slack on the shop floor: the planning for the first few 
weeks and the high uncertainty and ambiguity at the production management level. With that, shop 
floor learning was quite irrelevant at this stage. They learned more when they were doing their training 
than during these initial periods. But the situation was about to change, with the planned increases in 
production. 
 
Period 2: Integration through Negotiation 
 
As the planned daily production increased, the organization started to face new and difficult 
challenges. The performance of individual areas was still not at the expected level for regular 
production, and interaction patterns were still being formed. Problems were more exposed and could 
not be avoided through slack anymore. Areas now had to work together and achieve ambitious 
common goals. This shift brought many uncertainties as organizational members had to face new 
problems that they were not prepared to solve. During production meetings, there were long 
discussions regarding sources of problems, many times with no clear conclusions. A perceived quality 
problem, for example, could have different sources, and it usually took a long time to discover the 
right cause. Feedback was still scarce, so many decisions had to be taken without enough information. 
These discussions led to more fights between areas, which tried to avoid taking responsibility for 
problems. But there was a positive side: these conflicts triggered a response mechanism that became 
the main driver of integration among areas. With the pressing need for improvements, members started 
to negotiate many issues that were ambiguous or conflicting. These negotiations happened usually 
during the daily production meetings, or right after it if the topic was too specific to be treated in the 
meeting. Sometimes more conflicting, sometimes reflecting shared beliefs, negotiation served many 
purposes. It became a way to reduce ambiguity, distribute responsibilities, structure roles and develop 
rules of interaction. It combined the various knowledge bases distributed in different areas. Most of 
all, it became the basis for routinization of production management, its outcomes getting embedded in 
relationships between areas and locking the organization into specific development paths. 
This second phase was therefore marked by a shift from area to organizational learning. Areas had 
now developed more of their knowing, as well as having begun to improve their knowledge based on 
new necessities brought by knowing. The major trend at this phase was the integration of the learning 
curves developed by each area through the negotiation processes cited above. Sometimes the 
knowledge of the areas involved in a specific problem was still not adequate to solve it, and the usual 
outcome was a failed negotiation. In other words, their learning curves had still not reached levels 
where they could be integrated. These episodes of failed negotiations explain many of the spikes that 
can be observed in the learning curve during this period (see Figure 1). For example, one quality 
problem that happened during the first few weeks of production took a long time to be solved. As 
areas did not know the exact roots of the problem, nobody took responsibility to solve it. During 
meetings there were many attempts at negotiating this topic; all of them ended without a clear plan of 
action. Different possible causes of the problem were discussed, but meeting participants had no 
sufficient knowledge of the problem to choose any of the hypotheses, so action plans kept on being 
postponed. Negotiations failed because, under high ambiguity regarding sources of the problem, no 
agreement could satisfy all areas involved. The problem became so big that, when evidence for one of 
the possible causes was conclusive, top management decided to stop production until all cars produced 
up to that moment were checked and, if needed, reworked. All areas had to stop their work and help 
out with that task until it was finished, regardless of who was to ‘blame’ for the problem.  
The shop floor was now going through its crucial test. The company had made a risky decision, 
setting up the plant in a region where potential employees had no experience in a factory setting. Their 
training had been carefully designed, but doubts persisted among top managers as to whether shop 
floor workers would be able to meet the objectives. During this phase, their performance was quite 
satisfactory. Most problems at this phase were beyond the control of shop floor workers. Once again, 
missing parts and problems in the paint shop were the main reasons behind delays in the line. The only Learning Curve? Which One? 
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point where they were not performing very well regarded quality. With increasing pressures to meet 
production objectives, coupled with frequent shortages of parts or cars to assemble, they had to work 
at a very fast pace when the line was running. With that, they gave more priority to quantity than 
quality – also because they were rewarded mostly on the basis of quantity. The result was an 
increasing number of quality problems that had to be corrected through re-work. In order to do rework 
(and also to meet production objectives in weeks where the line had stopped too much), the 
organization started to rely more and more on overtime.  
After a first phase, during which individual learning at each area was the main mechanism for 
improvement, this second phase was marked by integration – of different learning curves and their 
underlying knowledge bases. With this integration, the overall assembly learning curve could progress 
at a much higher rate than before. Looking at the learning curve, this is the period were the most 
significant reductions in cost were achieved. These reductions were not due to increased skills on the 
shop floor, but increased organizational knowledge through integration of separate learning curves, 
which up to that moment were being developed at each area separately. 
 
Period 3: Routinization 
 
As areas developed and negotiated rules of interaction, the daily management of production became 
more routinized. Meetings were more objective, with less discussion and more focused problem-
solving. During the previous phase, discussion of one specific topic during a meeting could last up to 
thirty minutes, especially when there was a lot of negotiation involved. This number was considerably 
reduced: after some months of production, each topic was discussed for less than five minutes. 
Meetings now had set scripts and their main aim was to share information. At this stage, members had 
already developed a transactive memory. Transactive memory is defined as a shared system for 
encoding, storing and retrieving information, and it begins when individuals learn something about 
one another’s domain of expertise (WEGNER, 1986). Developed during the previous phase, 
transactive memory now allowed for faster access to relevant information. 
On the shop floor, they were also able to develop more stable working patterns. The constant 
interruptions and changes that characterized the initial months were almost over. Some work posts 
were still being redesigned, so there were changes in the sequence of activities, but by now most 
workers had the skills to work on different posts along the line. Workers showed some improvement 
in speed of activities, but most improvements came in quality. The percentage of cars that left the line 
without any problem more than tripled in a period of three weeks, reducing considerably the need for 
rework and overtime. The interesting feature here is that this rate of faultless cars leaving the line was 
low and without significant improvements for more than six months, then suddenly jumped in a 
relatively short period. This suggests that only when the integrative efforts at management reached a 
level that allowed production to stabilize could workers develop quality-related skills. They needed 
practice and stability to achieve the desired quality results. 
At this phase learning happened mostly though incremental processes, both induced and 
spontaneous. Experience brought an increased sensibility to identify and solve problems at the 
managerial level, and the number of suggestions for improvement coming from operational levels 
increased – an indicator that experience was also bringing more awareness to explore opportunities on 
the shop floor. There were still sources of instability, especially when the organization had to face 
novel problems. But the effect of these problems was less disruptive because the organization had 
already set structures for problem solving. As was the case happened in the first phase, learning was 
happening again mostly in individual areas, but now the organization as a whole could benefit from 
this learning because information and knowledge sharing processes were embedded in the daily 
practices of the plant. 
 Paulo Prochno 
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WHAT IS BEHIND THE LEARNING CURVE? 
 
 
As I started my field study, focused on the evolution of routines and capabilities in a new setting, I 
had some expectations regarding what was going to happen. I expected an incremental process by 
which workers would gradually get better at what they did, and these improvements would result in 
the famous learning curve. While this is adequate as a general description of the process, it misses a lot 
of the intricacies that make such learning possible. I will concentrate my discussion on the most 
important drivers of learning in the setting that I analysed, conceptualizing on the organizational 
processes behind the learning curve. The intention is to generate insights that can explain the 
phenomenon in more depth and help future studies into the topic by pointing out important directions 
for study. 
One first remark regards the role of planning in driving learning curve patterns. Learning curve is 
such a well-known phenomenon by this point that it became an input to the planning process that 
precedes the launch of a new setting. That way, when analyzing only performance numbers, it is 
difficult to separate what truly represents learning from what simply represents the way the 
organization planned the early evolution of the process. As my study suggested, planning numbers 
were an important driver of the early behavior of the learning curve. Even with the ambiguity 
problems at the production management level, there was considerable slack. Production could be 
higher if planning numbers were more ambitious, which would result in a different learning curve. 
Planning also played a role in triggering learning at the second stage. As expected daily production 
increased steeply, areas had to work under a sense of urgency that accelerated the integration of their 
knowledge bases and the increasing stabilization of procedures. That way, the learning curve may be 
as much a result as a cause (through planning) of the evolution path at the initial stages of a setting.  
One of the most interesting findings of the study regards the role played by the different learning 
curves happening at different places in the organization. Understanding how learning evolves at each 
area and how this localized learning is shared within the organization is a key step to understanding 
the major drivers behind the learning curve. 
The learning process began at each area separately, in the pre-production phase before daily 
interactions were necessary. Individuals and small groups learned through cognitive and experiential 
processes, and developed a specific knowledge base (containing both explicit and tacit knowledge) 
within their areas. For example, workers at production planning learned to use the company’s specific 
software, the rules that should be followed when programming production, the structure of their area 
and how to interact with their peers. People working at parts supply developed relationships with 
suppliers, learned about transportation options, customs rules, internal and external logistics. Some of 
this learning came through highly codified knowledge (company documents), some through 
interaction with peers (especially expatriates, who brought with them a lot of the tacit knowledge 
embedded in the company’s practices). But this localized knowledge, though very important to the 
activities of the company, was not enough to bring significant performance evolution. 
As interactions started, there was the need for the development of ‘knowing’, or an epistemology of 
action. This knowing was developed through experience, as members learned more about each other 
and formed a transactive memory. Through the development of knowing, organizational members also 
noticed they needed more knowledge that was required by other areas. With that, the ‘generative 
dance’ between knowledge and knowing started, as suggested by Cook and Brown (1999). In order to 
be able to combine their knowledge with the knowledge of other areas and apply this combination to 
identify and solve problems in the organization, knowledge and knowing needed to reach a certain 
threshold level at each area. Before that, integration and application of knowledge were very difficult. 
After that threshold was achieved, negotiation became the most important driver for integration. 
Figure 2 brings a summary of how knowledge and knowing evolved within areas. Learning Curve? Which One? 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following phase resulted in something similar to the ‘negotiated order’ concept developed by 
Strauss (1978). As Strauss defined it: “The negotiated order on any given day could be conceived of as 
the sum total of the organization’s rules and policies, along with whatever agreements, understandings, 
pacts, contracts, and other working arrangements currently obtained. These include agreements at 
every level of the organization, of every clique and coalition and include covert as well as overt 
agreements” (1978, p. 5-6). These agreements set the links among the various knowledge bases, 
resulting in a kind of synchronization of the individual area learning curves that enabled the evolution 
of the overall learning curve. From what I observed in the field, the only difference from the concept 
proposed by Strauss is that, once a negotiated order is achieved, it gets embedded in routines and is no 
longer open to further negotiations or agreements – at least for a considerable period of time (probably 
until routines change due to external or internal dynamics).  
During the negotiation period, big increases in rates of learning were observed. This is because 
organizational members were learning two critical processes together, problem identifying and 
problem solving. But the process was not stable, since solving some problems led to identification of 
novel issues to be dealt with. This triggered more individual and shared learning, further negotiations 
and new procedures.  
The negotiation process proceeded in loops until most of the major issues were resolved. Once a 
comprehensive negotiated order was achieved, organizational members started to act in a more 
routinized way. Everyday meetings followed the same structure, and much of the previous conflicts 
were absent. People already knew what to expect from their colleagues and from their areas. 
Routinization brought one important dimension for the further evolution of learning: stabilization. 
This stabilization facilitated learning on the shop floor, especially regarding quality. At this phase, 
learning was once again happening mostly within areas. But, as mechanisms for sharing were already 
in place, localized learning could bring improvements at the organizational level. 
Figure 3 brings a summary of the organizational processes that supported the evolution of the 
learning curve, showing the main characteristics of learning at each phase and the related 
organizational mechanisms, as well as characteristics of the knowledge development process and 
performance evolution. Transitions between periods were not as marked as my description suggests. I 
described the strongest characteristics of each period to show their distinctive features, but the 
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evolution of performance in the plant was an incremental process where characteristics of different 
periods could be found at the same time at some moments of the plant’s life. The transition from the 
first to the second period was triggered by the increase in planned daily production; from the second to 
the third period, by the accomplishment of a negotiated order that could be used to solve most 
problems.  Learning Curve? Which One? 
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Implications and Limitations 
 
The article illustrated the organizational processes behind the evolution of the learning curve in the 
first year of a new manufacturing plant. As such, it is one step toward a shift in the focus of learning 
curve studies: from the outcomes to the organizational processes behind it. Understanding these 
processes is crucial to explaining drivers of performance and to inform research on topics such as 
routines, knowledge development and integration, organizational learning, path-dependencies.  
There are some potential contributions to management practice as well. The case suggests that 
managers can try to accelerate the learning curve by developing knowing before actual production 
starts through early integration among areas. They should also concentrate resources on reaching 
knowledge threshold levels within their areas to allow for faster integration across areas. As with 
Adler’s (1990) results, shared learning seems to be crucial for performance development – in the case 
described here, it was shared learning across different areas at the launch phase of the productive 
process.  
One limitation of the study is its time frame. One year may be too short a period to observe the 
evolution of a learning curve. But the high competitive pressures to start producing as fast as possible 
in the country and the fact that the models had already been produced by the company elsewhere 
helped to accelerate that curve. In addition, as can be seen in Figure 1, the process was quite stable in 
the last part of the learning curve. I concentrated my efforts on observing the most critical phase, 
where both the rate of learning and instability were higher. 
There are also the usual limitations of ethnographic work. The objectives of ethnography are not the 
same as the ones in quantitative research. One cannot, for example, talk about ‘replication’ in 
ethnographic studies, or claim generalizability, at least in the typical usage of the word. But there are 
some evaluation criteria that can substitute for those coming from statistics-oriented research. Stewart 
(1998) proposes that, instead of validity, reliability and generalizability, ethnographies should aim at 
veracity, objectivity and perspicacity. Veracity means that the researcher has really observed what his 
descriptions claim. Objectivity is achieved when the study transcends the perspectives of the 
researcher and of the informants. Perspicacity implies that the research generates insights that are 
applicable to other times and other places. Although the theory generated from ethnographic data is 
obviously linked to the specific social setting, ethnographers can specify the contingencies for which 
the findings apply so they can be compared with other settings and other theories. This paper has made 
an effort to achieve these three characteristics, generating data-grounded insights that contribute 
towards understanding an important topic in organization studies.  
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